Poisoned Pipeline / Techniques / T0214
Rent co-located containers to scan an isolated network
The attacker rents or deploys a container on the same physical host as
the target — a multi-tenant GPU cloud, shared CI runner pool, or
co-tenanted PaaS — so that their scanning and exploitation traffic
originates from inside the tenant's network boundary. Rented
infrastructure is a legitimate customer workload: egress filtering,
IP reputation, and external attack-surface monitoring see it as normal
tenant traffic, and nothing resolves to attacker-owned addresses. From
the co-located container the attacker reaches internal-only surfaces —
Docker bridge networks, private service endpoints, unauthenticated
management ports, or notebooks bound to loopback — that are invisible
from the outside. Distinct from T0212 (subverting the routing layer
while destination infrastructure stays untouched) and T0205
(compromising third-party hosting): here the attacker buys a lawful
position adjacent to the victim. Observed in CloudSEK's analysis of a
leaked offensive control panel that rented containers beside vast.ai
tenants to scan the Docker bridge and reach unprotected notebooks.
Where this idea came from
This catalogue, from CloudSEK's analysis of a leaked offensive control panel (VHX Harvester) that rented containers beside vast.ai tenants on the same physical host to scan the Docker bridge and reach unprotected notebooks.
Mitigations
None linked yet.
Detections
None linked yet.
Observed in incidents (1)
References
None listed.