Poisoned Pipeline / Techniques / T0168
Exfiltration to code repositories
SCM Posture
Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a code repository rather than over their primary command and control channel.
Code repositories are often accessible via an API (ex: https://api.github.com, https://gitlab.com/api). Access to these APIs are often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection.
Exfiltration to a code repository can also provide a significant amount of cover to the adversary if it is a popular service already used by hosts within the network.
Where this idea came from
Analog of a well-known ATT&CK or AppSec technique, applied to software supply chain.
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/001/
- https://www.optimizationcore.com/security/github-exfiltration-indicators-threat-hunt-monitor-block/
Mitigations
- M1680 Limit access to code repositories
Detections
- D1510 Implement Intrusion Detection System and anti-malware
- D1590 Implement continuous monitoring and logging of the CI/CD process
- D1680 Monitor code repositories activity
Observed in incidents (9)
- actions-cool GitHub Action tags still serve Mini Shai-Hulud after re-enablement
- codfish/semantic-release-action tag hijack (Miasma)
- GhostAction steals CI secrets, then autoruns a stealer from a fake font
- Nx s1ngularity (stolen npm token via Actions injection)
- testmetest npm names ship a Miasma-family worm that wipes the home directory if a stolen GitHub token is revoked
- Shai-Hulud first wave (@ctrl/tinycolor)
- Stolen Heroku and Travis CI OAuth tokens cloned private GitHub repos
- TanStack Mini Shai-Hulud (CVE-2026-45321)
- Sha1-Hulud: The Second Coming