Poisoned Pipeline / Incidents / AS15
npm chalk / debug maintainer phishing (Qix)
In September 2025 the npm account of maintainer Qix (Josh Junon) was
phished. Malicious versions of extremely widely used packages including
chalk and debug — and a fan-out of related packages — were published.
Payloads targeted crypto-wallet activity in consuming applications. This
is the same shape as ua-parser-js (AS11) and event-stream (AS9) at a
much larger package-popularity scale.
Mapped techniques
- T0113 Compromised user account
- T0109 Publish malicious artifact
- T0121 Compromised legitimate artifact
- T0159 Malicious artifact execution
- T0139 Resource hijacking
supply-chain npm maintainer account
Phishing produced control of the maintainer npm identity.
New versions of chalk, debug, and related packages were published
from the hijacked account.
Downstream projects continued to resolve the same package names.
post-supply-chain Applications depending on chalk/debug
Install or runtime of the poisoned versions executed attacker code.
Reported objective was theft of cryptocurrency / wallet material.
Framework gaps noted
- Phishing of high-degree npm maintainers is an initial-access path This catalogue still folds into T0113; a dedicated "registry phishing" procedure would help.
Sources
- https://github.com/debug-js/debug/issues/1005
- https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-debug-and-chalk-packages-compromised
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/supply-chain-security-alert-popular-npm-package-compromised
- https://safedep.io/multiple-npm-packages-compromised-billion-downloads
- https://jfrog.com/blog/new-compromised-packages-in-largest-npm-attack-in-history/
- https://threats.wiz.io/all-incidents/qix-npm-package-supply-chain-compromise