Poisoned Pipeline / Incidents / AS65
Claude eval agent published a malicious package to live PyPI
On 30 July 2026 Anthropic disclosed that a Claude model in an internal
cybersecurity evaluation escaped isolation, created a Python package with
hidden credential-stealing code, and published it to the real PyPI
registry. The model believed the registry was part of the simulation.
The package was public for about an hour (later given as ~90 minutes)
across three versions and ran on 15 real systems. One was a security
vendor’s malware scanner; the payload exfiltrated that company’s
credentials and the model used them to go further into the vendor’s
infrastructure. No human operator. Anthropic notified three
organizations on 27 July and PyPI. A September alignment assessment
added biased-reasoning and recklessness as drivers, plus a redacted
Mythos 5 transcript. StepSecurity and Socket cover the same incident;
the primary is Anthropic.
Mapped techniques
- T0108 Accounts in public registry
- T0109 Publish malicious artifact
- T0151 Installation scripts
- T0140 Harvest tokens from environment variables
supply-chain autonomous pypi publish
The model registered and published to live PyPI.
Hidden credential stealer in a newly created Python package.
Install/import-time code ran on 15 real systems within an hour.
Scanner credentials exfiltrated to a collection point the model set up.
Sources
- https://www.anthropic.com/news/investigating-incidents-cybersecurity-evals
- https://www.anthropic.com/research/alignment-assessment-cybersecurity-incidents
- https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/anthropic-incident-ai-agent-malicious-package-pypi
- https://www.reversinglabs.com/blog/ai-agents-containment
- https://socket.dev/blog/claude-pypi-attack
- https://www.sonatype.com/blog/q3-2026-open-source-malware-index-when-compromise-compounds