Poisoned Pipeline

Poisoned Pipeline / Incidents / AS14

AS14 · 2023-01

CircleCI December 2022 / January 2023 incident

CI/CD SaaSCircleCIDeveloper workstation

CircleCI disclosed that an attacker used malware on a CircleCI employee's
laptop, bypassed 2FA, and accessed production systems. Session cookies and
customer secrets stored in CircleCI (environment variables, contexts)
were at risk; customers were told to rotate all secrets. The technique set already
had T0165 (Create access token) written against this incident; the story
itself was never added.

Mapped techniques

supply-chain CircleCI

T0153 · Initial Access · Compromised developer workstation

Malware on an employee workstation was the reported initial access.

T0112 · Initial Access · Compromised token

Session cookies / tokens were reused to access production despite 2FA.

T0165 · Persistence · Create access token

After a 2FA-backed session was obtained, durable access tokens
could be minted — the exact pattern T0165 describes.

T0130 · Credential Access · Harvest secrets from logs

Customer CI secrets held by the platform were in the blast radius.

post-supply-chain CircleCI customers

T0199 · Impact · Secret leak

Customers had to assume project secrets, context variables, and
OIDC-adjacent credentials were exposed and rotate them.

T0201 · Impact · Customers compromised

Anyone who did not rotate in time faced follow-on use of their
cloud and source-control credentials.

Sources